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## Please contact

Dr Xian-Mo Zhang School of Information Technology & Computer Science The University of Wollongong Wollongong, NSW 2522, AUSTRALIA E-mail: xianmo@cs.uow.edu.au Phone: +61 242 214825 Fax: +61 242 214170

# Relating Differential Distribution Tables to Other Properties of Substitution Boxes \*

Xian-Mo Zhang School of Information Technology & Computer Science The University of Wollongong Wollongong, NSW 2522, AUSTRALIA E-mail: xianmo@cs.uow.edu.au

Yuliang Zheng School of Computing and Information Technology Monash University Melbourne, VIC 3199, AUSTRALIA E-mail: yuliang@mars.fcit.monash.edu.au

Hideki Imai Institute of Industrial Science The University of Tokyo 7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106, JAPAN Email: imai@iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp

August 26, 1999

#### Abstract

Due to the success of differential and linear attacks on a large number of encryption algorithms, it is important to investigate relationships among various cryptographic, including differential and linear, characteristics of an S-box (substitution box). After discussing a precise relationship among three tables, namely the difference, auto-correlation and correlation immunity distribution tables, of an S-box, we develop a number of results on various properties of S-boxes. More specifically, we show (1) close connections among three indicators of S-boxes, (2) a tight lower bound on the sum of elements in the leftmost column of its differential distribution table, (3) a non-trivial and tight lower bound on the differential uniformity of an S-box, and (4) two upper bounds on the nonlinearity of S-boxes (one for a general, not necessarily regular, S-box and the other for a regular S-box).

<sup>\*</sup>Part of the results were presented at SAC'96.

## Key Words

Boolean Functions, Cryptography, Differential Attack, Nonlinearity, S-boxes

#### 1 Introduction

This paper deals with  $n \times m$  S-boxes with n > m. Success of the notable differential cryptanalysis on various block ciphers [3, 4] has motivated researchers to investigate properties of the difference distribution tables of S-boxes. A core topic in this endeavor is to discover relationships between differential distribution tables and other properties of S-boxes. In this paper we first introduce two additional tables associated with an S-box, these being the auto-correlation and correlation immunity distribution tables. Then we establish a precise relationship among the three tables of an S-box (i.e., the difference, auto-correlation and correlation immunity distribution tables). With this relationship as a basis, we show that an S-box is regular (or balanced) if and only if the sum of the values in the leftmost column of its difference distribution table is  $2^{2n-m}$ . In a sense, this result complements a well-known fact about the regularity of an S-box which states that an S-box is regular if and only if the non-zero linear combinations of its component functions are all balanced.

The next issue addressed in this paper is on the lower bound on the differential uniformity of an S-box which is defined as the largest non-zero value in the differential distribution table of the S-box, not taking into account the first entry in the top row. For an  $n \times m$  S-box, it is easy to see that its differential uniformity is at least  $2^{n-m}$ . As another contribution of this paper, we will show a new tight lower bound that improves the "trivial" bound of  $2^{n-m}$ .

The final issue addressed in this work relates more specifically the nonlinearity of an S-box to its difference distribution table. In particular, we give two upper bounds on the nonlinearity of the S-box, one for the case when the S-box is an arbitrary mapping and the other when it is regular. These two bounds are expressed in terms of three parameters: the number of input bits, the number of output bits and the number of non-zero entries in the entire difference distribution table or in the leftmost column of the difference distribution table of the S-box, respectively. We also compare the second new upper bound with previous works in the same area.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces formal notations and definitions used in this paper. The difference, auto-correlation and correlation immunity distribution tables of an S-box are defined in Section 3 where a precise relationship among the three tables is also established. An interesting connection between the regularity of an S-box and columns of its differential distribution table is presented in Section 4. A tight lower bound on the differential uniformity of an S-box is presented in Section 5, and then two upper bounds on the nonlinearity of an S-box and its difference distribution table are proved in Section 6. Section 7 closes the paper with some concluding remarks.

### 2 Basic Notations and Definitions

This section is intended as a summary of the minimum amount of mathematical knowledge required in rigorously treating issues on S-boxes to be discussed in this paper.

The vector space of n tuples of elements from GF(2) is denoted by  $V_n$ . These vectors, in ascending lexicographic order, are denoted by  $\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_{2^n-1}$ . As vectors in  $V_n$  and integers in

 $[0, 2^n - 1]$  have a natural one-to-one correspondence, it allows us to switch from a vector in  $V_n$  to its corresponding integer in  $[0, 2^n - 1]$ , and vice versa.

Let f be a function from  $V_n$  to GF(2) (or simply, a function on  $V_n$ ). The sequence of f is defined as  $((-1)^{f(\alpha_0)}, (-1)^{f(\alpha_1)}, \ldots, (-1)^{f(\alpha_{2^n-1})})$ , while the *truth table* of f is defined as  $(f(\alpha_0), f(\alpha_1), \ldots, f(\alpha_{2^n-1}))$ . f is said to be *balanced* if its truth table assumes an equal number of zeros and ones. We call  $h(x) = a_1x_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus a_nx_n \oplus c$  an *affine function*, where  $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$  and  $a_j, c \in GF(2)$ . In particular, h will be called a *linear function* if c = 0. The sequence of an affine (linear) function will be called an *affine (linear) sequence*.

The Hamming weight of a vector v, denoted by W(v), is the number of ones in v. Let f and g be functions on  $V_n$ . Then  $d(f,g) = \sum_{f(x) \neq g(x)} 1$ , where the addition is over the reals, is called the Hamming distance between f and g. Let  $\varphi_0, \ldots, \varphi_{2^{n+1}-1}$  be the affine functions on  $V_n$ . Then  $N_f = \min_{i=0,\ldots,2^{n+1}-1} d(f,\varphi_i)$  is called the *nonlinearity* of f. It is well-known that the nonlinearity of f on  $V_n$  satisfies  $N_f \leq 2^{n-1} - 2^{\frac{1}{2}n-1}$ . The equality holds if and only if f is bent (see P. 426 of [12]).

Given two sequences  $a = (a_1, \ldots, a_m)$  and  $b = (b_1, \ldots, b_m)$ , their component-wise product is denoted by a \* b, while the scalar product (sum of component-wise products) is denoted by  $\langle a, b \rangle$ .

**Definition 1** Let f be a function on  $V_n$ . For a vector  $\alpha \in V_n$ , denote by  $\xi(\alpha)$  the sequence of  $f(x \oplus \alpha)$ . Thus  $\xi(0)$  is the sequence of f itself and  $\xi(0) * \xi(\alpha)$  is the sequence of  $f(x) \oplus f(x \oplus \alpha)$ . Define the *auto-correlation* of f with a shift  $\alpha$  by

$$\Delta(\alpha) = \langle \xi(0), \xi(\alpha) \rangle.$$

The Sylvester-Hadamard matrix (or Walsh-Hadamard matrix) of order  $2^n$ , denoted by  $H_n$ , is generated by the recursive relation

$$H_n = \begin{bmatrix} H_{n-1} & H_{n-1} \\ H_{n-1} & -H_{n-1} \end{bmatrix}, \ n = 1, 2, \dots, \ H_0 = 1.$$

Each row (column) of  $H_n$  is a linear sequence of length  $2^n$ .

The following two formulas are well known to researchers (for a proof see for instance [14, 23]).

Let  $\xi$  be the sequence of a function f on  $V_n$ . Then the nonlinearity of f,  $N_f$  can be calculated by

$$N_f = 2^{n-1} - \frac{1}{2} \max\{|\langle \xi, \ell_i \rangle|, 0 \le i \le 2^n - 1\}$$
(1)

where  $\ell_i$  is the *i*th row of  $H_n$ ,  $i = 0, 1, \ldots, 2^n - 1$ , and

$$(\Delta(\alpha_0), \Delta(\alpha_1), \dots, \Delta(\alpha_{2^n-1}))H_n = (\langle \xi, \ell_0 \rangle^2, \langle \xi, \ell_1 \rangle^2, \dots, \langle \xi, \ell_{2^n-1} \rangle^2)$$
(2)

where  $\alpha_i$  is the binary representation of an integer *i* and  $\ell_i$  is the *i*th row of  $H_n$ ,  $i = 0, 1, \ldots, 2^n - 1$ .

An  $n \times m$  S-box or substitution box is a mapping from  $V_n$  to  $V_m$ , i.e.,  $F = (f_1, \ldots, f_m)$ , where n and m are integers with  $n \ge m \ge 1$  and each component function  $f_j$  is a function on  $V_n$ . In this paper, we use the terms of mapping and S-box interchangeably.

As can be seen from the design of many practical block ciphers, researchers are mainly concerned with regular S-boxes only. A mapping  $F = (f_1, \ldots, f_m)$  is said to be regular if F(x) runs through each vector in  $V_m \ 2^{n-m}$  times while x runs through  $V_n$  once. The following lemma states a useful result on the regularity of an S-box. This result has appeared in many different forms in the literature. Our description can be viewed as the binary version of Corollary 7.39 of [11].

**Lemma 1** Let  $F = (f_1, \ldots, f_m)$  be a mapping from  $V_n$  to  $V_m$ , where n and m are integers with  $n \ge m \ge 1$  and each  $f_j(x)$  is a function on  $V_n$ . Then F is regular if and only if every non-zero linear combination of  $f_1, \ldots, f_m$  is balanced.

The concept of nonlinearity can be extended to the case of an S-box [16].

**Definition 2** The standard definition of the *nonlinearity* of  $F = (f_1, \ldots, f_m)$  is

$$N_F = min_g \{ N_g | g = \bigoplus_{j=1}^m c_j f_j, \ c_j \in GF(2), g \neq 0 \}.$$

Now we consider an S-box in terms of its usefulness in designing a block cipher secure against differential cryptanalysis [3, 4]. The essence of a differential attack is to exploit particular entries in the difference distribution tables of S-boxes employed by a block cipher. The difference distribution table of an  $n \times m$  S-box is a  $2^n \times 2^m$  matrix. The rows of the matrix, indexed by the vectors in  $V_n$ , represent the changes in the inputs, while the columns, indexed by the vectors in  $V_m$ , represent the change in the output of the S-box. An entry in the table indexed by  $(\alpha, \beta)$  indicates the number of input vectors which, when changed by  $\alpha$  (in the sense of bit-wise XOR), result in a change in the output by  $\beta$  (also in the sense of bit-wise XOR). It should be pointed out that while in this paper the notation of difference is restricted to XOR differences, in general other differences are also of interest, such as those based on modular addition and multiplication.

Note that an entry in a difference distribution table can only take an even value, the sum of the values in a row is always  $2^n$ , and the top row is always  $(2^n, 0, \ldots, 0)$ . As entries with higher values in the table are particularly useful to differential cryptanalysis, a desirable condition for an S-box not to be exploited in differential cryptanalysis would be that it does not have large values in its differential distribution table (not taking into account the leftmost entry in the top row).

In measuring the strength of an S-box (in terms of the security of a block cipher that employs the S-box) against differential attacks, a useful indicator commonly used is *differential uniformity* which is defined as follows [17].

**Definition 3** Let F be an  $n \times m$  S-box, where  $n \ge m$ . Let  $\delta$  be the largest value in the differential distribution table of the S-box (not taking into account the leftmost entry in the top row), namely,

$$\delta = \max_{\alpha \in V_n, \alpha \neq 0} \max_{\beta \in V_m} \#\{x | F(x) \oplus F(x \oplus \alpha) = \beta\}$$

Then F is said to be differentially  $\delta$ -uniform, and accordingly,  $\delta$  is called the differential uniformity of F.

An important ingredient in designing cryptographic Boolean functions is bent functions. Below is the formal definition of bent functions. **Definition 4** Let f be a function on  $V_n$  and  $\xi$  denote the sequence of f. Then f is called a bent function if

$$|\langle \xi, \ell_i \rangle| = 2^{\frac{n}{2}}$$

 $i = 0, 1, \ldots, 2^n - 1$ , where  $\ell_i$  denotes the *i*th row of  $H_n$ .

Bent functions can be characterized in various ways [2, 8, 20, 23, 26]. A characterization of particular interest can be found in [8, 20] which states that bent functions on  $V_n$  exist only when n is even, and that they achieve the highest possible nonlinearity on  $V_n$ , namely,  $2^{n-1} - 2^{\frac{n}{2}-1}$ .

#### 3 Relationships among Three Tables

Now we introduce three more notations,  $k_j(\alpha)$ ,  $\Delta_j(\alpha)$  and  $\eta_j$ , associated with an S-box  $F = (f_1, \ldots, f_m)$ .

**Definition 5** Let  $F = (f_1, \ldots, f_m)$  be an  $n \times m$  S-box,  $\alpha \in V_n$ ,  $j = 0, 1, \ldots, 2^m - 1$  and  $\beta_j = (b_1, \ldots, b_m)$  be the vector in  $V_m$  that corresponds to the binary representation of j. In addition, set  $g_j = \bigoplus_{u=1}^m b_u f_u$  be the jth linear combination of the component functions of F. Then we define

- 1.  $k_j(\alpha)$  as the number of times  $F(x) \oplus F(x \oplus \alpha)$  equals  $\beta_j \in V_m$  while x runs through  $V_n$  once,
- 2.  $\Delta_j(\alpha)$  as the auto-correlation of  $g_j$  with a shift  $\alpha$ ,
- 3.  $\eta_j$  as the sequence of  $g_j$ .

Since both  $\eta_0$  and  $\ell_0$  are the all-one sequence of length  $2^n$  and  $\ell_j$  is (1, -1) balanced for j > 0, we have

$$\langle \eta_0, \ell_0 \rangle = 2^n, \ \langle \eta_0, \ell_j \rangle = 0, \ j = 1, \dots, 2^n - 1.$$
 (3)

From the definition of  $k_j(\alpha_i)$ , one can see that the sum of the entries in each row of K is  $2^n$ , and that the first row has the form of  $(2^n, 0, \ldots, 0)$ . Namely,

$$\sum_{j=0}^{2^{m}-1} k_j(\alpha_i) = 2^n, \ i = 0, 1, \dots, 2^n - 1,$$
(4)

and

$$k_0(\alpha_0) = 2^n, \ k_j(\alpha_0) = 0, \ j = 1, \dots, 2^m - 1.$$
 (5)

Using the three notations introduced above, we formally define three tables/matrices related to  $F = (f_1, \ldots, f_m).$ 

**Definition 6** For an S-box  $F = (f_1, \ldots, f_m)$ , set

$$K = \begin{bmatrix} k_0(\alpha_0) & k_1(\alpha_0) & \dots & k_{2^m-1}(\alpha_0) \\ k_0(\alpha_1) & k_1(\alpha_1) & \dots & k_{2^m-1}(\alpha_1) \\ & \vdots & & \\ k_0(\alpha_{2^n-1}) & k_1(\alpha_{2^n-1}) & \dots & k_{2^m-1}(\alpha_{2^n-1}) \end{bmatrix}$$

$$D = \begin{bmatrix} \Delta_0(\alpha_0) & \Delta_1(\alpha_0) & \dots & \Delta_{2^m-1}(\alpha_0) \\ \Delta_0(\alpha_1) & \Delta_1(\alpha_1) & \dots & \Delta_{2^m-1}(\alpha_1) \\ \vdots & & & \\ \Delta_0(\alpha_{2^n-1}) & \Delta_1(\alpha_{2^n-1}) & \dots & \Delta_{2^m-1}(\alpha_{2^n-1}) \end{bmatrix}$$
$$P = \begin{bmatrix} \langle \eta_0, \ell_0 \rangle^2 & \langle \eta_1, \ell_0 \rangle^2 & \dots & \langle \eta_{2^m-1}, \ell_0 \rangle^2 \\ \langle \eta_0, \ell_1 \rangle^2 & \langle \eta_1, \ell_1 \rangle^2 & \dots & \langle \eta_{2^m-1}, \ell_1 \rangle^2 \\ \vdots \\ \langle \eta_0, \ell_{2^n-1} \rangle^2 & \langle \eta_1, \ell_{2^n-1} \rangle^2 & \dots & \langle \eta_{2^m-1}, \ell_{2^n-1} \rangle^2 \end{bmatrix}$$

and

where  $\ell_i$  is the *i*th row of  $H_n$ ,  $i = 0, 1, ..., 2^n - 1$ . The three tables (or matrices) K, D and P share the same size of  $2^n \times 2^m$ . Clearly K is the difference distribution table of F that has already been (informally) introduced in Section 2. The other two tables, D and P, are called *auto-correlation* distribution table and correlation immunity distribution table of the S-box F, respectively.

In designing a strong S-box, many cryptographic criteria should be examined not only against component functions, but also against their linear combinations. Such criteria include those related to nonlinearity, propagation characteristics [19] and difference distribution tables. The matrix Kcharacterizes the differential characteristics of an S-box. The matrix D indicates the auto-correlation of all linear combinations of the component functions. While the matrix P represents the inner product between the sequence of each linear combination of the component functions and each linear sequence. P is helpful in studying the correlation immunity, as well as the nonlinearity, of each linear combination of the component functions (see [22]).

The following lemma shows an intimate relationship between the three tables K, D and P defined above. The lemma can be easily shown to be correct by the use of a connection between the Hamming distance between rows and the distribution of ones in the columns in a (0, 1) matrix. For completeness, a full proof for the lemma is provided in the appendix. It turns out that the lemma is very useful in examining cryptographic properties of an S-box, and it will be used in proving many of the main results in this paper.

**Lemma 2** Let  $F = (f_1, \ldots, f_m)$  be a mapping from  $V_n$  to  $V_m$ , where n and m are integers with  $n \ge m \ge 1$  and each  $f_j$  is a function on  $V_n$ . Set  $g_j = \bigoplus_{u=1}^m c_u f_u$  where  $(c_1, \ldots, c_m)$  is the binary representation of an integer  $j, j = 0, 1, \ldots, 2^m - 1$ . Then

- (i)  $(k_0(\alpha_i), k_1(\alpha_i), \dots, k_{2^m-1}(\alpha_i))H_m = (\Delta_0(\alpha_i), \Delta_1(\alpha_i), \dots, \Delta_{2^m-1}(\alpha_i))$ , where  $\alpha_i$  is the binary representation of an integer i,
- (*ii*)  $D = KH_m$ ,
- (*iii*)  $P = H_n D$ ,
- (iv)  $P = H_n K H_m$ .

When n = m and F is regular, a similar relation between matrices K and P has been derived in [7]. As permutations, a special type of S-boxes, are used in many cryptographic algorithms, it is of interest is to look into how the three tables of a permutation are connected to the three corresponding tables of the inverse of the permutation. The following result is easy to verify. **Corollary 1** Let F be a permutation on  $V_n$  and  $F^{-1}$  denote the inverse of F. Let  $K = (k_i(\alpha_j))$ ,  $D = (\Delta_i(\alpha_j))$  and  $P = (\langle \eta_i, \ell_j \rangle)$  be the difference distribution, auto-correlation distribution and correlation immunity distribution tables of F. Similarly, let  $K^* = (k_i^*(\alpha_j))$ ,  $D^* = (\Delta_i^*(\alpha_j))$  and  $P^* = (\langle \eta_i^*, \ell_j \rangle)$  be the difference distribution, auto-correlation distribution and correlation immunity distribution tables of  $F^{-1}$ . Then

 $(i) \quad K^* = K^T,$ 

(*ii*) 
$$P^* = P^T$$
,

(*iii*)  $D^* = H_n^{-1} D^T H_n$ .

### 4 Regularity of S-boxes and Difference Distribution Tables

Using Lemma 2, we now show that the regularity of an S-box can be characterized by its difference distribution table. This characterization nicely complements Lemma 1 which is stated in terms of the balance of non-zero linear combinations of component functions of an S-box.

**Corollary 2** Let  $F = (f_1, \ldots, f_m)$  be a mapping from  $V_n$  to  $V_m$ , where n and m are integers with  $n \ge m \ge 1$  and each  $f_j$  is a function on  $V_n$ . Then F is regular if and only if the sum of the entries in each column in the difference distribution table is  $2^{2n-m}$ , i.e.,  $\sum_{\alpha \in V_n} k_i(\alpha) = 2^{2n-m}$ ,  $i = 0, 1, \ldots, 2^m - 1$ .

*Proof.* Compare the first rows in both sides of the formula in Part (iv) of Lemma 2,

$$\left(\sum_{\alpha \in V_n} k_0(\alpha), \sum_{\alpha \in V_n} k_1(\alpha), \dots, \sum_{\alpha \in V_n} k_{2^m - 1}(\alpha)\right) H_m = \left(\langle \eta_0, \ell_0 \rangle^2, \langle \eta_1, \ell_0 \rangle^2, \dots, \langle \eta_{2^m - 1}, \ell_0 \rangle^2\right).$$
(6)

Obviously, if  $\sum_{\alpha \in V_n} k_i(\alpha) = 2^{2n-m}$ ,  $i = 0, 1, \ldots, 2^m - 1$  then  $\langle \eta_1, \ell_0 \rangle^2 = \cdots = \langle \eta_{2^m-1}, \ell_0 \rangle^2 = 0$ . Note that  $\ell_0$  is the all-one sequence of length  $2^n$ . Hence  $g_1, \ldots, g_{2^m-1}$  are balanced, where  $g_1, \ldots, g_{2^m-1}$  are defined in Lemma 2. By Lemma 1, F is regular.

Conversely, suppose F is regular. By Lemma 1,  $g_1, \ldots, g_{2^m-1}$  are balanced. Hence  $\langle \eta_1, \ell_0 \rangle^2 = \cdots = \langle \eta_{2^m-1}, \ell_0 \rangle^2 = 0$ . Note that  $\langle \eta_0, \ell_0 \rangle^2 = 2^{2^n}$ . Rewrite (6) as

$$2^{m} \left( \sum_{\alpha \in V_{n}} k_{0}(\alpha), \sum_{\alpha \in V_{n}} k_{1}(\alpha), \cdots, \sum_{\alpha \in V_{n}} k_{2^{m}-1}(\alpha) \right) = (2^{2^{n}}, 0, \dots, 0) H_{m}.$$

This proves that  $\sum_{\alpha \in V_n} k_i(\alpha) = 2^{2n-m}, i = 0, 1, \dots, 2^m - 1.$ 

Corollary 2 has also been obtained independently by Tapia-Recillas, Daltabuit and Vega [25].

The following corollary shows the uniqueness of the leftmost column of the difference distribution table of a regular mapping.

**Theorem 1** Let  $F = (f_1, \ldots, f_m)$  be a mapping from  $V_n$  to  $V_m$ , where n and m are integers with  $n \ge m \ge 1$  and each  $f_j$  is a function on  $V_n$ . Then

(i)  $\sum_{\alpha \in V_n} k_0(\alpha) \ge 2^{2n-m}$ ,

(ii) the equality in (i) holds if and only if F is regular.

(i) Right-multiplying both sides of the equality in Part (iv) of Lemma 2 by  $e^T$  where, e Proof. denotes the all-one sequence of length  $2^m$ . Hence we have

$$H_{n}\begin{bmatrix}k_{0}(\alpha_{0}) & k_{1}(\alpha_{0}) & \dots & k_{2^{m}-1}(\alpha_{0})\\k_{0}(\alpha_{1}) & k_{1}(\alpha_{1}) & \dots & k_{2^{m}-1}(\alpha_{1})\\\vdots\\k_{0}(\alpha_{2^{n}-1}) & k_{1}(\alpha_{2^{n}-1}) & \dots & k_{2^{m}-1}(\alpha_{2^{n}-1})\end{bmatrix}\begin{bmatrix}2^{m}\\0\\\vdots\\0\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}\sum_{j=0}^{2^{m}-1}\langle\eta_{j},\ell_{0}\rangle^{2}\\\sum_{j=0}^{2^{m}-1}\langle\eta_{j},\ell_{1}\rangle^{2}\\\vdots\\\sum_{j=0}^{2^{m}-1}\langle\eta_{j},\ell_{2^{n}-1}\rangle^{2}\end{bmatrix}$$

and hence

$$2^{m}H_{n}\begin{bmatrix}k_{0}(\alpha_{0})\\k_{0}(\alpha_{1})\\\vdots\\k_{0}(\alpha_{2^{n}-1})\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}\sum_{j=0}^{2^{m}-1}\langle\eta_{j},\ell_{0}\rangle^{2}\\\sum_{j=0}^{2^{m}-1}\langle\eta_{j},\ell_{1}\rangle^{2}\\\vdots\\\sum_{j=0}^{2^{m}-1}\langle\eta_{j},\ell_{2^{n}-1}\rangle^{2}\end{bmatrix}.$$
(7)

Comparing the top element of the vector on the two sides of equality (7), the following is obtained

$$2^{m} \sum_{i=0}^{2^{n}-1} k_{0}(\alpha_{i}) = \sum_{j=0}^{2^{m}-1} \langle \eta_{j}, \ell_{0} \rangle^{2}.$$
(8)

Recall (3),  $\langle \eta_0, \ell_0 \rangle^2 = 2^{2n}$ . From (8), we have proved Part (i) of the theorem. (ii) Suppose  $\sum_{\alpha \in V_n} k_0(\alpha) = 2^{2n-m}$ , then from (8),  $\langle \eta_1, \ell_0 \rangle^2 = \cdots = \langle \eta_{2^m-1}, \ell_0 \rangle^2 = 0$ . Note that  $\ell_0$  is the all-one sequence of length  $2^n$ . Hence  $g_1, \ldots, g_{2^m-1}$  are balanced, where  $g_1, \ldots, g_{2^m-1}$  are defined in Lemma 2. By Lemma 1, F is regular.

Conversely, if F is regular, then by Corollary 2,  $\sum_{\alpha \in V_n} k_0(\alpha) = 2^{2n-m}$ . The proof of the theorem is completed. 

#### A Lower Bound on Differential Uniformity 5

We turn our attention back to the differential uniformity, denoted by  $\delta$ , of an  $n \times m$  S-box. Recall that  $\delta$  is defined as the largest value in the differential distribution table of the S-box (not taking into account the leftmost entry in the top row), namely,

$$\delta = \max_{\alpha \in V_n, \alpha \neq 0} \max_{\beta \in V_m} \# \{ x | F(x) \oplus F(x \oplus \alpha) = \beta \}$$

(See Definition 3). As discussed earlier,  $\delta$  is bounded by  $2^{n-m} \leq \delta \leq 2^n$ , and generally speaking S-boxes with a smaller  $\delta$  are desirable in designing a block cipher secure against differential attacks. This motivates us to improve the "trivial" lower bound  $2^{n-m}$  on the differential uniformity  $\delta$ .

The following lemma will be used in our discussions. It is identical to Lemma 2 of [27].

**Lemma 3** Let real valued sequences  $a_0, \ldots, a_{2^n-1}$  and  $b_0, \ldots, b_{2^n-1}$  satisfy

$$(a_0,\ldots,a_{2^n-1})H_n = (b_0,\ldots,b_{2^n-1})$$

For any integer p and q,  $p+q = n, 1 \leq p, q \leq n-1$ , set  $\sigma_j = \sum_{s=0}^{2^q-1} b_{j2^q+s}$ , where  $j = 0, 1, ..., 2^p - 1$ . Then

$$2^{q}(a_{0}, a_{2^{q}}, a_{2 \cdot 2^{q}}, \dots, a_{(2^{p}-1)2^{q}})H_{p} = (\sigma_{0}, \sigma_{1}, \dots, \sigma_{2^{p}-1}).$$
(9)

Now we prove another main result of this paper.

**Theorem 2** Let  $F = (f_1, \ldots, f_m)$  be an  $n \times m$  S-box, where n and m are integers with  $n \ge m \ge 1$ and each  $f_j$  is a function on  $V_n$ . Set  $g_j = \bigoplus_{u=1}^m c_u f_u$  where  $(c_1, \ldots, c_m)$  is the binary representation of an integer j,  $j = 0, 1, \ldots, 2^m - 1$ . Denote by  $\Delta_j(\alpha)$  the auto-correlation of  $g_j$  with a shift  $\alpha$ , and set  $\Delta_M = \max_{\alpha \in V_n, \alpha \neq 0} \max_{j=1,\ldots,2^m-1} \{|\Delta_j(\alpha)|\}$ . Then the differential uniformity  $\delta$  of F is bounded from below by  $2^{n-m} + 2^{-m} \Delta_M$ , namely,

$$\delta \ge 2^{n-m} + 2^{-m} \Delta_M.$$

*Proof.* Let  $\Delta_{j'}(\alpha_{i'}) = \Delta_M$ . By Part (i) of Lemma 2, we have

$$2^{-m}(\Delta_0(\alpha_{i'}), \Delta_1(\alpha_{i'}), \dots, \Delta_{2^m-1}(\alpha_{i'}))H_m = (k_0(\alpha_i'), k_1(\alpha_i'), \dots, k_{2^m-1}(\alpha_i'))$$
(10)

Applying Lemma 3 to (10), we get

$$2^{m-1}2^{-m}(\Delta_0(\alpha_{i'}), \Delta_{2^{m-1}}(\alpha_{i'}))H_1 = (\sigma_0, \sigma_1)$$

where  $\sigma_j = \sum_{s=0}^{2^{m-1}-1} k_{j2^{m-1}+s}, j = 0, 1$ . Hence

$$2^{-1}(\Delta_0(\alpha_{i'}) + \Delta_{2^{m-1}}(\alpha_{i'})) = \sigma_0$$

and

$$2^{-1}(\Delta_0(\alpha_{i'}) - \Delta_{2^{m-1}}(\alpha_{i'})) = \sigma_1$$

Thus there is a  $j_0 2^q + s_0$  for  $0 \leq s_0 \leq 2^{m-1} - 1$  and  $j_0 = 0$  or 1, such that

$$k_{j_0 2^q + s_0} \ge 2^{-m} (\Delta_0(\alpha_{i'}) + \Delta_{2^{m-1}}(\alpha_{i'})).$$

Recall that  $\Delta_0(\alpha) = 2^n$  for all  $\alpha \in V_n$ . So we have

$$k_{j_0 2^q + s_0} \ge 2^{-m} (2^n + \Delta_{2^{m-1}}(\alpha_{i'})).$$

According to Section 5.3 of [21], the differential uniformity of F is invariant under a nonsingular linear transformation on the variables of F. Thus by choosing an appropriate nonsingular linear transformation on the variables of F, we have

 $k_{j_0 2^q + s_0} \geqq 2^{n-m} + 2^{-m} \Delta_M$ 

and hence

$$\delta \ge 2^{n-m} + 2^{-m} \Delta_M.$$

Examining the new lower bound of  $2^{n-m} + 2^{-m}\Delta_M$  on the differential uniformity  $\delta$ , where  $\Delta_M$  is the largest value among all  $|\Delta_j(\alpha)|$  with  $j = 1, \ldots, 2^m - 1$ ,  $\alpha \in V_n$  and  $\alpha \neq 0$ , a natural question would be how large and small  $\Delta_M$  can be and what could be its typical value.

First of all, by the definition of  $\Delta_M$ , we have  $0 \leq \Delta_M \leq 2^n$ . When  $\Delta_M = 0$ , every non-zero linear combination of the components of F must be a bent function. And the converse is also true: if every non-zero linear combination of the components of F is a bent function, then we must have  $\Delta_M = 0$ . Note that in this case we have  $\delta = 2^{n-m}$ , which indicates that the bound in Theorem 2 is tight. Also note that such S-boxes do exist [1, 15], although they are not regular.

On the other hand, if  $\Delta_M = 2^n$ , then there must exist a non-zero vector  $\alpha$  such that it is a linear structure of a non-zero linear combination, say  $g_j$ , of the component functions of F, i.e.,  $g_j(x) \oplus g_j(x \oplus \alpha)$  is a constant. Similarly, the converse is also true.

For other S-boxes, namely those whose non-zero linear combinations of component functions are not all bent, and do not have non-zero linear structures, their  $\Delta_M$  will be a value between 0 and  $2^n$ . Although it is not quite clear as to what would be the typical value of  $\Delta_M$  for such S-boxes, from the bound  $\delta \geq 2^{n-m} + 2^{-m}\Delta_M$ , at least one thing can be said: if an S-box is designed to resist against differential attacks, then its differential uniformity must be small, and hence its  $\Delta_M$  must be small too; conversely, if an S-box has a small  $\Delta_M$ , we would expect that it could have a small differential uniformity too.

### 6 Upper Bounds on Nonlinearity of S-boxes

After the discovery of differential attacks in [4], an equally notable cryptanalysis method, the linear cryptanalytic attack, was subsequently introduced in [13]. Identifying relationships between these two types of attacks has been an interesting research area, both from the view point of cryptanalysis and the design of secure ciphers. We will first show a tight upper bound on the nonlinearity of a general S-box. This will be followed by another upper bound on the nonlinearity of a regular S-box. The usefulness of such an explicit relationship is obvious: the nonlinearity of an S-box represents a key indicator for the strength of a block cipher that employs the S-box. We also compare our result on the relationship with a related theorem in [6].

In studying an  $n \times m$  S-box, a possible approach would be to use the two parameters n and m alone in determining information on the S-box. Success of this approach, however, seems to have been limited to the case of  $m \ge n-1$  with which an upper bound on nonlinearity has been obtained in [6] (but see discussions in the closing paragraph of this section.)

Another approach that can be used to obtain far more detailed information on an S-box is to take into account all the  $k_j(\alpha)$ ,  $\Delta_j(\alpha)$ , or  $\langle \eta_j, \ell_i \rangle^2$ , for  $j = 0, 1, \ldots, 2^m - 1$ ,  $i = 0, 1, \ldots, 2^n - 1$  and  $\alpha \in V_n$ (see Definition 5). A potential problem with this approach is that it would be impractical to apply it to an S-box with relatively large n and/or m. In what follows, we adopt a different approach that employs more parameters other than n and m, and hence can be viewed as a compromise between the above two approaches. More specifically, we prove two theorems that relate the nonlinearity of an  $n \times m$  S-box to three parameters, namely n, m and the number of non-zero entries in its difference distribution table K.

#### 6.1 General Case

Here we consider  $n \times m$  S-box that is not necessarily regular. In addition, the restriction of  $n \ge m$  is not imposed on the S-box. We first introduce Hölder's Inequality which can be found in [9].

**Lemma 4** Let  $c_j \ge 0$  and  $d_j \ge 0$  be real numbers, where  $j = 1, \ldots, s$ , and let p and q satisfy  $\frac{1}{p} + \frac{1}{q} = 1$  and p > 1. Then

$$(\sum_{j=1}^{s} c_{j}^{p})^{1/p} (\sum_{j=1}^{s} d_{j}^{q})^{1/q} \ge \sum_{j=1}^{s} c_{j} d_{j}$$

where the quality holds if and only if  $c_j = \nu d_j$ ,  $j = 1, \ldots, s$  for a constant  $\nu \ge 0$ .

When  $c_j$ ,  $d_j$ , p and q satisfy the condition that  $c_j \ge 0$ ,  $d_j = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } c_j = 1 \\ 0 & \text{if } c_j = 0 \end{cases}$ , and  $p = q = \frac{1}{2}$ , Hölder's Inequality gives

$$\sum_{j=1}^{s} c_j^2 \ge s^{-1} (\sum_{j=1}^{s} c_j)^2 \tag{11}$$

where the quality holds if and only if  $c_1, \ldots, c_s$  are all identical. The inequality (11) will be used in the proof of the following two theorems regarding the upper bound on the nonlinearity of an S-box.

**Theorem 3** Let F be an  $n \times m$  S-box (F is not necessarily regular, and the restriction of  $n \ge m$ is not imposed on it). Denote by  $T_{nz}$  the total number of all non-zero entries, except for  $k_0(\alpha_0)$ , in the difference distribution table K of the S-box (see Definition 6). Then

(i) the nonlinearity of F satisfies

$$N_F \leq 2^{n-1} - \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{2^{2n+m} - 2^{3n} + T_{nz}^{-1} 2^{2n+m} (2^n - 1)^2}{2^m - 1} \right)^{\frac{1}{4}},$$

(ii) the equality in (i) holds if and only if every non-zero linear combination of the component functions of F is a bent function.

*Proof.* We first prove Part (i) of the theorem. Using Part (iv) of Lemma 2, we have

$$P^{T}P = H_{m}K^{T}H_{n}^{T}H_{n}KH_{m} = 2^{n}H_{m}K^{T}KH_{m} = 2^{n+m}H_{m}^{-1}K^{T}KH_{m}.$$

Note that the sum of entries on the diagonal of  $P^T P$  is equal to the sum of entries on the diagonal of  $2^{n+m}K^T K$ . Hence

$$\sum_{j=0}^{2^{m}-1} \sum_{i=0}^{2^{n}-1} \langle \eta_{j}, \ell_{i} \rangle^{4} = 2^{n+m} \sum_{j=0}^{2^{m}-1} \sum_{i=0}^{2^{n}-1} k_{j}^{2}(\alpha_{i}).$$

From (3), (4) and (5) in Section 3, we have

$$2^{4n} + \sum_{j=1}^{2^m - 1} \sum_{i=0}^{2^n - 1} \langle \eta_j, \ell_i \rangle^4 = 2^{n+m} (2^{2n} + \sum_{j=0}^{2^m - 1} \sum_{i=1}^{2^n - 1} k_j^2(\alpha_i)).$$

Now combining (4) with (11), a special form of Hölder's Inequality, we have

$$\sum_{j=0}^{2^{m}-1} \sum_{i=1}^{2^{n}-1} k_{j}^{2}(\alpha_{i}) \ge T_{nz}^{-1} (\sum_{j=0}^{2^{m}-1} \sum_{i=1}^{2^{n}-1} k_{j}(\alpha_{i}))^{2} = T_{nz}^{-1} 2^{2^{n}} (2^{n}-1)^{2}.$$
(12)

Hence there is a certain  $j_0, 1 \leq j_0 \leq 2^m - 1$ , and a certain  $i_0, 0 \leq i_0 \leq 2^n - 1$ , such that

$$\langle \eta_{j_0}, \ell_{i_0} \rangle^4 \ge \frac{2^{n+m} (2^{2n} + T_{nz}^{-1} 2^{2n} (2^n - 1)^2) - 2^{4n}}{(2^m - 1)2^n}$$

which implies

$$|\langle \eta_{j_0}, \ell_{i_0} \rangle| \ge \left(\frac{2^{2n+m} - 2^{3n} + T_{nz}^{-1} 2^{2n+m} (2^n - 1)^2}{2^m - 1}\right)^{\frac{1}{4}}$$

Now applying (1) we obtain Part (i) of the theorem.

Note that since  $T_{nz} \leq 2^m(2^n-1)$ , we have  $T_{nz}^{-1}2^{2n+m}(2^n-1)^2 \geq 2^{2n}(2^n-1)$ . That is, the expression under the fourth root is always positive.

Now we prove Part (ii). First assume that the equality in Part (i) holds. From the definition of  $N_F$ , as well as (1), we have

$$|\langle \eta_j, \ell_i \rangle| \le \left(\frac{2^{2n+m} - 2^{3n} + T_{nz}^{-1} 2^{2n+m} (2^n - 1)^2}{2^m - 1}\right)^{\frac{1}{4}}$$
(13)

for all  $j = 1, ..., 2^m - 1$  and  $i = 0, 1, ..., 2^n - 1$ . Returning to the proof of Part (i), we can see that (13) implies that the equality on the left hand side of (12) must hold. Namely,

$$\sum_{j=0}^{2^{m}-1} \sum_{i=1}^{2^{n}-1} k_{j}^{2}(\alpha_{i}) = T_{nz}^{-1} (\sum_{j=0}^{2^{m}-1} \sum_{i=1}^{2^{n}-1} k_{j}(\alpha_{i}))^{2}$$

Again using (11), the special form of Hölder's Inequality, there exists a constant k such that  $k_j(\alpha_i) = k$ , for all  $j = 0, 1, \ldots, 2^m - 1$  and  $i = 1, \ldots, 2^n - 1$ . From (4), the constant k must satisfy the condition of  $k = 2^{n-m}$ . Note also that in this case,  $T_{nz} = 2^m(2^n - 1)$ . Thus due to Theorem 3.1 in [15], we conclude that every non-zero linear combination of the component functions of F is a bent function. A consequence of this conclusion is that in this case, n must be even and  $m \leq \frac{1}{2}n$  [15].

Conversely, assume that every non-zero linear combination of the component functions of F is a bent function. Once again employing Theorem 3.1 in [15], we have  $k_j(\alpha_i) = 2^{n-m}$  for  $j = 0, 1, \ldots, 2^m - 1$  and  $i = 1, \ldots, 2^n - 1$ . In this case, the total number of non-zero entries in the table K is  $T_{nz} = 2^m(2^n - 1)$ . Now the inequality in Part (i) of the theorem becomes

$$N_F \le 2^{n-1} - 2^{\frac{n}{2}-1}.\tag{14}$$

On the other hand, since every non-zero linear combination of the component functions of F is a bent function, the equality in (14) must hold i.e. the equality in Part (i) of the theorem holds. This completes the proof of Part (ii).

We note that for a permutation on  $V_n$ , results obtained in [18] imply that the expected value of  $T_{nz}$  approaches  $(1 - e^{-\frac{1}{2}})(2^n - 1)^2$ , when n is large, where e = 2.718... By using Theorem 3, the expected value of  $N_F$  for a permutation satisfies

$$N_F \leq 2^{n-1} - \frac{2^{\frac{3}{4}n-1}}{\sqrt[4]{(1-e^{-\frac{1}{2}})(2^n-1)}}$$

Before moving on to the next topic on regular S-boxes, we would like to stress that Theorem 3 shows a tight upper bound on the nonlinearity of a general S-box which does not have to be regular. We also note that an S-box that achieves the upper bound in theorem has a flat difference distribution table and hence is weak against differential cryptanalysis.

#### 6.2 For a Regular S-box

As we mentioned earlier, most encryption algorithms employ regular S-boxes. Hence such S-boxes play a more important role than does an irregular one. Our research results to be described below show that the nonlinearity of a regular  $n \times m$  S-box can be determined by n, m and a third parameter that counts only the number of non-zero entries in the leftmost column of the difference distribution table of the S-box.

We begin with examining partitions of the leftmost column of a difference distribution table.

**Lemma 5** Let F be a mapping from  $V_n$  to  $V_m$  and K is the difference distribution table of F. Then the leftmost column of K is determined by a  $2^m$ -partition of  $V_n$ , say  $V_n = \Omega_0 \cup \cdots \cup \Omega_{2^m-1}$ , that satisfies the condition that  $\Omega_j \cap \Omega_i = \emptyset$  for all  $j \neq i$ .

*Proof.* For each  $\beta \in V_m$ , define  $\Omega_\beta = \{\alpha \in V_n | F(\alpha) = \beta\}$ . Note that we use an integer in  $[0, \ldots, 2^m - 1]$  and a vector in  $V_m$  interchangeably. Clearly

$$V_n = \bigcup_{\beta \in V_m} \Omega_\beta \tag{15}$$

and  $\Omega_{\beta'} \cap \Omega_{\beta''} = \emptyset$  if  $\beta' \neq \beta''$ . Note that  $F(x) \oplus F(x \oplus \alpha) = 0$  if and only if both x and  $x \oplus \alpha$  belong to the same class, say  $\Omega_{\beta}$ .

Now we modify the mapping F into F' by applying an arbitrary permutation on  $V_m$  to the output of F. Clearly the partition in (15) remains unchanged, and  $F'(x) \oplus F'(x \oplus \alpha) = 0$  if and only if both x and  $x \oplus \alpha$  belong to the same class in (15). This proves that the leftmost columns of the difference distribution tables of F and F' are the same.

Armed with Lemma 5, we are ready to prove the following.

**Theorem 4** Let F be a regular  $n \times m$  S-box (For such an S-box  $n \ge m$  is necessary). Denote by  $t_{nz}$  the total number of non-zero entries (except for  $k_0(\alpha_0)$ ) in the leftmost column of the difference distribution table K of F. Then the nonlinearity of F satisfies

$$N_F \leq 2^{n-1} - \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{2^{3n+2m} - 2^{4n} + t_{nz}^{-1} \cdot 2^{3n+2m} (2^{n-m} - 1)^2}{(2^n - 1)(2^m - 1)^2} \right)^{\frac{1}{4}}.$$

*Proof.* Left-multiplying the transposes of the two sides in (7), we have

$$\left(\sum_{j=0}^{2^{m}-1} \langle \eta_{j}, \ell_{0} \rangle^{2}\right)^{2} + \left(\sum_{j=0}^{2^{m}-1} \langle \eta_{j}, \ell_{1} \rangle^{2}\right)^{2} + \dots + \left(\sum_{j=0}^{2^{m}-1} \langle \eta_{j}, \ell_{2^{n}-1} \rangle^{2}\right)^{2} = 2^{2^{m}+n} \sum_{i=0}^{2^{n}-1} k_{0}^{2}(\alpha_{i})$$
(16)

Since both  $\eta_0$  and  $\ell_0$  are an all-one sequence, we have  $\langle \eta_0, \ell_0 \rangle = 2^n$ . Recall that F is regular. By Lemma 1, each non-zero linear combination of the component functions of F is balanced. Thus for

 $j = 1, \ldots, 2^m - 1, \eta_j$  is (1, -1) balanced and we have  $\langle \eta_j, \ell_0 \rangle = 0$ . Also recall the definition in (3) and the fact that  $\ell_j$  is (1, -1) balanced for j > 0, we can see that  $\langle \eta_0, \ell_j \rangle = 0$  for  $j = 1, \ldots, 2^n - 1$ .

Note that  $k_0(\alpha_0) = 2^n$ . So (16) can be specialized as

$$\left(\sum_{j=1}^{2^{m}-1} \langle \eta_j, \ell_1 \rangle^2\right)^2 + \dots + \left(\sum_{j=1}^{2^m-1} \langle \eta_j, \ell_{2^n-1} \rangle^2\right)^2 = 2^{2m+3n} - 2^{4n} + 2^{2m+n} \sum_{i=1}^{2^n-1} k_0^2(\alpha_i)$$
(17)

By using (11)

$$\sum_{i=1}^{2^{n}-1} k_0^2(\alpha_i) \ge t_{nz}^{-1} (\sum_{i=1}^{2^n-1} k_0(\alpha_i))^2.$$

Note that F is regular and  $k_0(\alpha_0) = 2^k$ . By using Corollary 1,  $\sum_{i=1}^{2^n-1} k_0(\alpha_i) \ge 2^{2n-m} - 2^n$ . Hence

$$\sum_{i=1}^{2^{n}-1} k_0^2(\alpha_i) \ge t_{nz}^{-1} \cdot (2^{2n-m} - 2^m)^2.$$

Thus there is an  $i_0, 1 \leq i_0 \leq 2^n - 1$ , such that

$$\sum_{j=1}^{2^{m}-1} \langle \eta_j, \ell_{i_0} \rangle^2 \ge \left( \frac{2^{3n+2m} - 2^{4n} + t_{nz}^{-1} \cdot 2^n (2^{2n} - 2^{n+m})^2}{2^n - 1} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}}.$$

Since  $t_{nz} \leq 2^n - 1$ , it is easy to verify that the expression under the square root is always positive. Furthermore there is a  $j_0, 1 \leq j_0 \leq 2^m - 1$ , such that

$$|\langle \eta_{j_0}, \ell_{i_0} \rangle| \ge \left(\frac{2^{3n+2m} - 2^{4n} + t_{nz}^{-1} \cdot 2^n (2^{2n} - 2^{n+m})^2}{(2^n - 1)(2^m - 1)^2}\right)^{\frac{1}{4}}.$$

Now the theorem follows immediately from (1).

For a permutation F on  $V_n$ , (F must be regular), again from results obtained in [18], we know that the expected value of  $t_{nz}$  approaches  $(1 - e^{-\frac{1}{2}})(2^n - 1)$ , while n is large enough, where e = 2.718... This, together with Theorem 4, shows that the expected value of  $N_F$  for regular S-boxes is bounded from above by  $2^{n-1} - \frac{2^{n-1}}{\sqrt{2^n-1}}$ . Namely,

$$N_F \leq 2^{n-1} - \frac{2^{n-1}}{\sqrt{2^n - 1}}.$$

#### 6.3 Remarks on the Two Upper Bounds

Comparing Theorem 3 with Theorem 4, we note that while the former deals with a general S-box which is not necessarily regular, the latter is strictly on a regular S-box. Therefore the condition that  $n \geq m$  is required only in Theorem 4. In addition to n and m, both theorems employ a third parameter in upper bounding the nonlinearity of an S-box. The third parameter  $T_{nz}$  used in Theorem 3 is the total number of non-zero entries in the *entire* difference distribution table of the S-box (not taking into account the first entry in the leftmost column). In contrast, the third parameter  $t_{nz}$  used in Theorem 4 is the total number of non-zero entries in the *leftmost column* in

the difference distribution table of the S-box (again not taking into account the first entry in the column).

Another difference between Theorems 3 and 4 is that while the bound in the former is tight, it is unclear whether the same can be said with the latter. This is, however, not surprising, given that identifying the exact upper bound on the nonlinearity of a balanced function is one of the outstanding open problems in the study of nonlinear Boolean functions.

A direct consequence of Theorem 3 is that with any  $n \times m$  S-box with n > m, be it regular or irregular, the larger the number of non-zero entries in the difference distribution table, the larger the upper bound on the nonlinearity of the S-box. To interpret the theorem in a different way, if one wishes to design an S-box that is resistant against linear attacks, namely highly nonlinear, then one should make sure that a large portion of entries in the difference distribution table of the S-box is non-zero. Interestingly, as a larger  $T_{nz}$  also means a wider spread of non-zero entries across the entire difference distribution table, such an S-box can potentially have a higher resilience against differential attacks.

What Theorem 4 implies is that for a regular S-box,  $t_{nz}$ , the number of non-zero entries in the leftmost column of its difference distribution table, effects the resistance against linear and differential attacks in a way similar to that of  $T_{nz}$ . Thus, in designing a regular S-box, one prefers both a large  $t_{nz}$  and a large  $T_{nz}$ . It should be pointed out, however, that other factors should be taken into account too. Examples of such factors include successful attacks that exploit non-zero entries in the leftmost column of a difference distribution table [4, 5, 21], and high order differential attacks recently developed in [10].

Before closing this section, we note that a paper by Chabaud and Vaudenay [6] is a prior work most relevant to this research. A main result in [6] is their Theorem 4 which is equivalent to stating that for every mapping from  $V_n$  to  $V_m$ , say F, the nonlinearity of F,  $N_F$ , satisfies

$$N_F \leq 2^{n-1} - \frac{1}{2} (3 \cdot 2^n - 2 - \frac{2(2^n - 1)(2^{n-1} - 1)}{2^m - 1})^{\frac{1}{2}}.$$
 (18)

Examining the part under the square root in the expression, one can see that it is negative if  $m \leq n-2$ . Therefore, (18) is applicable only to  $n \times m$  S-boxes with  $m \geq n-1$ .

### 7 Concluding Remarks

We have introduced three tables associated with an S-box, and based on a relationship among the three tables, we have established a number of results ranging from regularity, nonexistence of certain quadratic S-boxes, to a tight lower bound on the differential uniformity and two upper bounds on the nonlinearity of an S-box.

In light of recent progress in interpolation and high order differential cryptanalysis [10, 24], a natural topic that deserves immediate attention is to research into high order differential distribution tables of S-boxes, together with connections to other cryptographic properties of S-boxes.

#### Acknowledgement

The first author was supported by a Queen Elizabeth II Research Fellowship (227 23 1002). Part of the second author's work was completed while on sabbatical at the University of Tokyo.

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### Appendix: The Proof of Lemma 2

There are close relationships between the Hamming distance between rows and the distribution of ones in the columns in a (0,1) matrix. Such relationships have been very useful in constructing linear error correcting codes. In this appendix we review some of the relationships from the view point of Hadamard transforms. Once the relationships are clear, the proof of Lemma 2 becomes straightforward.

Let  $t \geq s$ , and A be an  $s \times t$  (0,1) matrix with rank s. Set

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} \xi_0 \\ \xi_1 \\ \vdots \\ \xi_{s-1} \end{bmatrix} = (a_{ij}) = [\chi_0, \chi_1, \cdots, \chi_{t-1}],$$
(19)

where  $\xi_i \in V_t$  is the *i*th row vector and  $\chi_j \in V_s$  is the *j*th column vector of A.

We are concerned with all the linear combinations of  $\xi_0, \xi_1, \ldots, \xi_{s-1}$ , denoted by  $\eta_0, \eta_1, \ldots, \eta_{2^{s-1}}$ , where  $\eta_j = \bigoplus_{u=0}^{s-1} c_u \xi_u$ ,  $(c_0, c_1, \ldots, c_{s-1})$  is the binary representation of an integer  $j, j = 0, 1, \ldots, 2^s - 1$ . Now set

$$B = \begin{bmatrix} \eta_0 \\ \eta_1 \\ \vdots \\ \eta_{2^s - 1} \end{bmatrix} = (b_{ij}) = [\gamma_0, \gamma_1, \cdots, \gamma_{t-1}],$$
(20)

where B is a (0, 1) matrix of order  $2^s \times t$  and  $\gamma_j \in V_{2^s}$  is the *j*th column vector of B. Replace every 0 entry in B with 1, and every 1 entry in B with -1. Then denote by  $B^*$  the new (1, -1) matrix of order  $2^s \times t$ . Write

$$B^* = (b_{ij}^*) = \begin{bmatrix} R_0 \\ R_1 \\ \vdots \\ R_{2^s-1} \end{bmatrix} = [h_0, h_1, \cdots, h_{t-1}],$$
(21)

where  $R_i$  is the *i*th row vector and  $h_j$  is the *j*th column vector of  $B^*$ . One can verify that each  $h_j$  is a linear sequence of length  $2^s$ .

Let  $B^*$  be the matrix defined in (21),  $e_0, e_1, \ldots, e_{2^s-1}$  be the row vectors, from the top to the bottom, of  $H_s$ . Assume that  $e_j$  appears  $k_j$  times in the columns of  $B^*$ . We now prove

$$e_i B^* B^{*T} e_j^T = \begin{cases} k_j 2^{2s} & \text{if } e_i = e_j \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$
(22)

Write  $e_i B^* = (c_0^*, \dots, c_{t-1}^*)$  where

$$c_u^* = \begin{cases} 2^s & \text{if } e_i^T = h_u \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
(23)

for all u = 0, ..., t - 1. Similarly, write  $e_j B^* = (d_0^*, ..., d_{t-1}^*)$ , where

$$d_u^* = \begin{cases} 2^s & \text{if } e_j^T = h_u \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
(24)

for all u = 0, ..., t - 1.

If  $e_i = e_j$ , then  $e_i B^* B^{*T} e_j^T = \sum_{u=0}^{t-1} c_u^* c_u^* = k_j 2^{2s}$ . On the other hand, if  $e_i \neq e_j$ , then by (23) and (24),  $c_u^* \neq 0$  implies  $d_u^* = 0$ , which results in  $e_i B^* B^{*T} e_j^T = \sum_{u=0}^{t-1} c_u^* d_u^* = 0$ . This proves (22).

As the Sylvester-Hadamard matrix  $H_m$  is symmetric, (22) can be equivalently stated as:

$$H_s B^* B^{*T} H_s = 2^{2s} \operatorname{diag}(k_0, k_1, \dots, k_{2^s - 1}).$$
(25)

Let  $R_j$  be a row of  $B^*$  defined in (21) and  $k_j$  the number of times a row vector  $e_j$  in  $H_s$  appears in the columns of  $B^*$ . From (25) we have  $B^*B^{*T} = H_s \operatorname{diag}(k_0, k_1, \ldots, k_{2^s-1})H_s$ . Comparing the first rows in the two sides of the equation, we have

$$(\langle R_0, R_0 \rangle, \langle R_0, R_1 \rangle, \dots, \langle R_0, R_{2^s - 1} \rangle) = (k_0, k_1, \dots, k_{2^s - 1}) H_s.$$
 (26)

Now we are in a position to prove Lemma 2. Consider an  $s \times t$  matrix A defined in (19) with s = m and t = n. Let a row  $\xi_i$  in (19) be the truth table of  $f_i(x) \oplus f_i(x \oplus \alpha)$ ,  $i = 0, 1, \ldots, m-1$ . Correspondingly,  $\eta_i$  in (20) denotes the truth table of  $g_i(x) \oplus g_i(x \oplus \alpha)$ , and  $R_i$  in (21) denotes the sequence of  $g_i(x) \oplus g_i(x \oplus \alpha)$ ,  $i = 0, 1, \ldots, 2^m - 1$ .

As  $g_0$  is the zero function,  $R_0$  is the all-one sequence. Hence  $\langle R_0, R_i \rangle$  is equal to the sum of the components in  $R_i$ . That is,  $\langle R_0, R_i \rangle = \Delta_i(\alpha)$ . Hence Part (i) of Lemma 2 follows from (26).

For  $\alpha = \alpha_0, \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_{2^n-1}$ , Part (i) of Lemma 2 gives  $2^n$  equations. These equations can be written as Part (ii) of the lemma. Part (iii) of the lemma follows from (2). And finally Parts (ii) and (iii) of the lemma together give Part (iv) of the lemma.